Abstract. We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which are usually differentiated from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays only.
Introduction
Selfish behavior is one of the primary reasons many systems with multiple agents deviate from desirable outcomes. Allowing players to prioritize solely their own benefit can lead to social inefficiency, even in outcomes where no one is better off, compared to an optimal solution yet the social welfare is greatly diminished.
This type of behavior has been analyzed in various contexts and has often been verified in practice. A key such area is transportation and network routing where selfish selection among possible routes can lead to congestion with accompanying economical and environmental issues.
There exists a great amount of literature trying to address this problem both on the basis of theoretical analysis and in practice. A standard and reasonable modeling assumption is that all users choosing to use a particular road experience the same amount of latency. Then, the outcome is typically evaluated against the optimal social welfare outcome which minimizes the average latency the users experience.
Various approaches have been proposed to steer the selfishly constructed outcome towards optimal social welfare. The main idea is usually to incentivize the users to alter their selections to better ones, typically through the use of tolls or similar measures.
We propose an alternative approach that alters the way users experience latency and can offer significant improvements on average latency. Instead of all users experiencing the same latency, as if everyone rushing to use the road at the same time, we propose to implement variable latencies through a prioritization scheme. Some users will experience smaller latency than before, while others will experience longer latencies. We show that our system, if users behave selfishly as expected, achieves approximately the optimal social welfare.
It is important to note that our system's average latency on each road closely matches the road's average latency without the system in place, hence our system falls under the notion of coordination mechanisms and we have not "cheated" by decreasing latencies or imposing tolls; we are simply distributing the resource differently. This holds on any instance, not just equilibrium settings, which means that even non stable situations we do not get worse performance. Furthermore, we do not need to know the demand in advance, i.e. our system delivers the social optimum for all possible total amounts of traffic. Our only requirement is that the latency induced on each road is a non-negative, non-decreasing, continuously differentiable and convex function of the traffic.
We believe our system has basis for practical implementation. For example, some countries have already implemented metered highway entrance ramps which can vary the latency of incoming drivers. Traffic signals can also be used in an urban environment to implement this aspect of our mechanism. We deliberately leave the prioritization scheme generic to allow for different such approaches with our only requirement being that users choosing to alter their current selection are forced to experience maximal latency in their new selection, a reasonable requirement as typically someone that alters their selection in a running system ends up at the end of a queue.
We examine our system in the generic scheme of congestion games. As such, it can have other application besides traffic routing. One interesting application could be in the context of job scheduling. Again, in a typical model, each user choosing to use a particular resource experiences the same latency, for example computing jobs running in parallel on a computer. By prioritizing jobs according to our proposed mechanism such that some jobs complete faster and some slower than before we can achieve optimal average job completion times under selfish behavior. We note that this can be easily implemented by an administrator using system priorities.
Related work
The fact that selfish behavior can lead to inefficiency has been long studied in the context of transportation theory [8, 11] . More recently, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou introduced the Price of Anarchy as a measure of this inefficiency [6, 7] . Exploration of this metric in the context of selfish routing was then greatly progressed by Roughgarden and Tardos [10, 9] which bounded the price of anarchy for different classes of latency functions.
Naturally, ways to improve inefficient outcomes were investigated, with a prime example being the imposement of tolls [3, 4, 5] . While this approach achieves optimal social welfare regarding latencies, it introduces a cost separation to the players as the tolls' cost is affecting behavior but is not accounted for in the objective function.
Coordination mechanisms were introduced by Christodoulou et al. [1] as a way to "shape" latency functions to steer the selfishly dictated outcome towards greater social welfare. There are two main restrictions in a coordination mechanism as defined in [1] , first the latency on each resource is not reduced and secondly the benchmark optimal social welfare is still the one without any additional latencies the coordination mechanism may impose. It has been recently shown that indeed such mechanisms can positively affect social welfare [2] . In this work, the non-decreasing of the latency is respected not for every unit but on the average.
Model
We define a congestion game (E, l, S, d) in the generic sense but using network routing terminology for convenience. First, a set E of edges with an associated non-negative, non-decreasing, continuously differentiable and convex l e (x e ) latency function for each edge. We note that these assumptions are typical for latency functions. We have n player types 1, 2, . . . , k, and for each player type i there is a finite multiset S i of subsets of E, called the strategy set of players of type i. A particular element S ∈ S i is a single strategy of player type i. We also have a demand d i for each player type i.
We assume that player types are non-atomic, i.e. they consist of infinitely small users or infinitely divisible traffic. Let x In related literature, the cost induced to each player type i by a flow x is the sum of latencies of edges used by all players of the specific type, c i (x) = e∈E l e (x e ) · x i e . The social cost is
For reference, we also note the Wardrop equilibrium in our setting. Definition 1. We say that the flow vector x is in Wardrop equilibrium if for all players' type i and for any pairs of strategies (paths) S 1 , S 2 ∈ S i , if x S1 i > 0 then the following holds:
(1)
Variable delay mechanism
Given a congestion game (E, l, S, d) with non-negative, non-decreasing, continuously differentiable and convex latency functions, we propose a coordination mechanism which induces cost to players as follows: Let N = (N e ) e∈E be a sequence of positive integers indexed by the set of elements (edges) E to be called a batch system. A positive integer b ≤ N e is referred to as a batch index at edge e. The integer N e is the number of batches the flow at each e will be divided. Specifically at each edge e, the flow of any player type through a path S such that e ∈ S, and consequently the total flow x e through e, are divided into N e equal batches. Now consider the following functions, known as marginal-cost latency functions:
where l ′ e () is the derivative of l e (). The latency induced to players at an edge e is not going to be equal to all. Instead, flow of any player type and through any path S at batch b receives latencyl e ((b/N e )x e ) per unit. Players are interested in minimizing their own latency. Note that this assignment can be performed by any desired policy, for example, randomly, first-come first-serve, by priority lists etc. We will refer to the previous model of applying equal latency to all players as the latencies or original model.
Since each batch b receives latencyl e ((b/N e )x e ) per unit, we define the cost with respect to the batch system at an an edge with flow x e to be: c e (x e ) = (x e /N e ) Ne b=1l e ((b/N e )x e ) and the social cost with respect to the batch system
Note thatĉ e (x e ) ≥ xe Definition 2. We say that the flow vector x is in equilibrium with respect to the batch system if for all players i and for any pairs of strategies (paths) S 1 , S 2 ∈ S i , if x S1 i > 0, then for any sequence of positive integers (batch indices) (b e ) e∈E such that ∀e b e ≤ N e , the following holds:
Intuitively, if an atom changes path, then we assume that it gets to the last batch of every new edge of the new path, and that under this assumption, there is no strict gain in total per unit latency. Also, at an intuitive level, we assume that the atoms of the flow are indistinguishable, so it makes sense to consider all possible batch assignments along the edges of a path, i.e. even batch assignments where an early batch in an edge in the beginning of a path is followed by a late batch in the last edges of the path (if atoms were not indistinguishable, then there might arise issues with the implementation policy on the batch assignments). We have the following:
The flow vector x is in equilibrium with respect to the batch system iff it is in Wardrop equilibrium with respect to the marginal-cost latency functionŝ l e (x e ) = l e (x e ) + l ′ e (x e ) · x e , i.e. iff for all players i and for any pairs of strategies (paths) S 1 , S 2 ∈ S i , if x S1 i > 0, then e∈S1l e (x e ) ≤ e∈S2l e (x e ).
Proof. Since l e () are convex,l e are non-decreasing. Because the inequality in Definition 2 holds for any selection of batch indices, and therefore also for b e = N e . The lemma easily follows.
We now state the following well known facts derived from the literature [9] . Fact 3 A flow vector x in Wardrop equilibrium with respect to the marginal cost latencies l e (x e ) + l ′ e (x e ) · x e has a social cost C(x) with respect to the latency functions l e which is optimal.
We will now transfer these results in our variable delay batch setting. Theorem 1. Under the variable delay mechanism, any batch system has a unique equilibrium (as defined in Definition 2). Moreover, there is always a suitable batch system whose cost, with respect to the batch system, when in equilibrium (in the sense of Definition 2) is arbitrarily close to the optimal social cost of the latencies model.
Proof. Indeed by the preceding Facts 1-3, and by Lemma 1, it suffices to prove that if a flow x is in equilibrium with respect to a suitable batch system, then its costĈ(x) with respect to the batch system is arbitrarily close to the social cost C(x) of the latencies model. This however is immediate to see sincê c e (x e ) = (x e /N e ) Ne b=1l e ((b/N e )x e ) can be made arbitrarily close to xe 0l e (z)dz = l e (x e )x e = c e (x e ) by choosing for each e a large enough N e .
Discussion
Aside from the assumptions on the nature of the individual latency functions, perhaps more interestingly, we require a mechanism that can allocate variable cost at the flow within an edge and also "enforce" that anyone attempting to switch strategies is "penalized" by getting the worst possible cost on his new strategy.
In the context of road networks, these requirements could be implemented in practice by traffic management tools such as traffic lights and access passes. Especially in a dynamic setting one could implement such mechanism by motivating drivers to not deviate from their strategies with incentives (parking, passes, etc.) that vest over time, as long as the driver's strategy remains unchanged.
For applications in the computer or network domain, such a mechanism could be implemented much easier by priorities at the software/hardware level. For example in job scheduling, operating system priority handling could easily be used while in network scheduling, packet switching at the router level could satisfy our requirements.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank George Christodoulou for the very helpful discussions.
